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Abstract Sharvit (2003) proposes a semantics for try inspired by Landman’s (1992)
account of progressive aspect. This paper discusses two empirical shortcomings
of Sharvit’s analysis and proposes a new solution that retains Sharvit’s insight that
try has an aspectual meaning but argues that (a) as suggested by much work in
action theory, volitional events include an initial stage corresponding to a ‘mental
action’ and (b) try picks out the ‘mental action’ stage of an event. The proposal is
formalized by adapting Condoravdi’s (2009) theory of progressive meaning.
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1 Introduction
Control predicates such as want, claim and try as exemplified in (1) can be divided
into two classes. On the one hand, there are those like want and claim that may
participate in a syntactic frame in which the controlled position is replaced by an
overt subject via ECM (2a) or via finite complementation (2b). On the other hand,
there are those like try that never allow for an embedded subject (2c).1
(1) a. John wanted [to open the door].
b. John claimed [to have opened the door].
c. John tried [to open the door].
(2) a. John wanted [(for) Bill to open the door].
b. John claimed [that Bill opened the door].
c. * John tried [(for) Bill to open the door / that Bill opened the door].
∗ For helpful discussion on the topics discussed in the paper, thanks are due to Itamar Francez, Anastasia
Giannakidou, Hans Kamp, Chris Kennedy, Eric McReady, participants at a University of Chicago
Semantics and Philosophy of Language workshop in April 2011, and participants at the SALT 21
poster session. Responsibility for the content of this paper, of course, lies solely with the author.
1 Control verbs that behave like try in this respect include implicative verbs, aspectual verbs, and
circumstantial modals. However, the control status of the latter two classes has come under question
in recent years; see Rochette 1999, Fukuda to appear on aspectual verbs and Bhatt 1998, Hackl 1998,
Wurmbrand 1999 on circumstantial modals.
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The existence of this split raises an important question: does it have a semantic
basis? Is there something about the meaning of try (and other predicates in its
class) that imposes an identity requirement between its subject and the subject of its
complement? A crucial precondition to answering this question — and the focus
of this paper — is a thorough understanding of what try in fact denotes. As it
happens, try has received very little attention in formal semantics, with the recent
exception of Sharvit 2003. Sharvit proposes that try has the semantics of an aspectual
morpheme, with a particular similarity to progressive aspect. (See also Cinque 2006
for crosslinguistic evidence from restructuring and verbal morphosyntax that try
instantiates conative aspect.) Sharvit formalizes this proposal using a semantics
based on Landman’s (1992) ‘continuation branch’ approach to progressive aspect.
However, as I will show below, Sharvit’s approach faces empirical shortcomings
that motivate a new account informed by two lines of inquiry. The first line of inquiry
is in the philosophical literature on action theory, where it has been proposed that
trying denotes mental action (O’Shaughnessy 1973, Hornsby 1980, Pietroski 2008,
Lorini & Herzig 2008). The second line of inquiry is an updated understanding of
the semantics of the progressive as found in Condoravdi 2009.
I will retain Sharvit’s core idea that try is closely related to progressive aspect,
but I will argue that (a) volitional events include an initial stage corresponding to
a ‘mental action’, (b) try picks out the ‘mental action’ stage of an event, and (c)
the theory of aspectual meaning that most readily lends itself to formalizing this
approach is Condoravdi’s. For Condoravdi, the semantics of the progressive has
two components: there must be an event that has been realized to a contextually
determined degree in the evaluation world, and worlds in which the event progresses
further must be ranked higher than the evaluation world with respect to a contextually
determined ordering source. In a nutshell, what I will propose is that try is amenable
to a similar analysis, with two important differences. First, rather than being sensitive
to a contextually determined degree, try merely asserts that the event has been
realized to a degree above zero. Second, rather than being sensitive to a contextually
determined ordering source, the ordering source associated with try is always based
on the intentions of the entity named in subject position.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Sharvit’s (2003)
semantics for try. Section 3 identifies two empirical challenges facing Sharvit’s
account. Section 4 introduces the action-theoretical concept of ‘mental action’ and
shows how it can be applied to the semantics of try in a way that responds to the
challenges raised in the previous section. Section 5 reviews Condoravdi’s semantics
for the progressive, and section 6 uses this as the basis for a new formalization for
the semantics of try. Section 7 returns to the syntactic question raised at the outset
of the introduction and offers preliminary remarks on what the semantics of try may
tell us about its syntax. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Sharvit 2003: A ‘continuation branch’ semantics
2.1 The obligatory existential reading
Sharvit (2003) proposes an aspectual semantics for try, with a formalization based
on Landman’s (1992) account of the progressive. Sharvit’s empirical motivation for
an aspectual semantics for try has to do with an entailment pattern that obtains with
try in combination with certain kinds of event descriptions. In particular, Sharvit
notes that a hallmark of propositional attitude verbs like want is the availability of
non-existential readings for indefinite NPs in their scope, as in (3a). In some cases,
try behaves the same way, as in (3b):
(3) a. John wanted to find a syntax book, but there were no syntax books around.
b. John tried to find a syntax book, but there were no syntax books around.
(Sharvit 2003: 404)
Sharvit observes, however, that for some kinds of event descriptions, this parallel
does not obtain: whereas indefinite NPs in the scope of want consistently allow
non-existential readings, this is not always the case for try:
(4) a. John wanted to cut a tomato, but there were no tomatoes to cut.
b. John tried to cut a tomato, ##but there were no tomatoes to cut.
(5) a. Mary wanted to push a cart, but there were no carts to push.
b. Mary tried to push a cart, ##but there were no carts to push.
(6) a. Bill wanted to start a car, but there was no car to start.
b. Bill tried to start a car, ##but there was no car to start.
(Sharvit 2003: 405)
On the view that try denotes a garden-variety propositional attitude, this pattern-
ing is unexpected. Sharvit’s intuition about this patterning — which forms the basis
of her account — is as follows:
“Intuitively, it seems that try differs from its cousins want, expect,
believe, etc. in that it doesn’t simply express an attitude of some
individual toward some ‘proposition’, but that it also expresses some
activity . . . This required ‘action’ is extensional, in the sense that it
has to go on in the actual world for the sentence to be judged true.”
(Sharvit 2003: 407)
For Sharvit, the ‘extensional action’ component of try makes try akin to progressive
aspect.
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2.2 A semantics for the progressive based on Landman 1992
According to Landman (1992) (cf. also Dowty 1979), the progressive establishes a
relationship between an event description and some event in the evaluation world.
(7), for example, is used to assert that there is some event in the evaluation world
that bears a particular relationship to a John-cross-the-street event. Given that (7)
is consistent with a situation in which John does not successfully cross the street
(he may, e.g., change his mind halfway through and turn around), the fundamental
problem of the progressive is to specify the nature of this relationship.
(7) John was crossing the street.
Landman’s (1992) answer to this problem relies crucially on the idea of a
continuation branch: in order to evaluate a sentence in the progressive, we use the
evaluation world w and the ongoing event e to construct a sequence of event-world
pairings that track the progression of e in worlds potentially different from w. For
Landman, every event has a uniquely determined continuation branch: we trace the
progression of e in w, and if something interrupts e in w, then we go to the closest
world where e is not interrupted and which is a reasonable option for e in w. If there
is no such world, then the continuation branch stops. For a progressive sentence to
be true for an event e in w, then e’s continuation branch must contain an event that
verifies the given event description.
Sharvit modifies Landman’s proposal slightly by considering that every event
has multiple continuation branches that differ in their tolerance for what a realistic
progression is. One particular class of continuation branches — realistic continuation
branches — play an important role in Sharvit’s account. Sharvit defines a realistic
continuation branch as follows:
(8) a realistic continuation branch of e relative to w is a sequence 〈〈e1,w1〉, . . . ,〈en,wn〉〉
such that (a)–(d) hold:
a. w1 = w, e1 = e, and for any m, em is an event in wm;
b. if n > 1, then for any m such that n > m ≥ 1: (i) em is a proper stage of
em+1; and (ii) there is an event in wm (Max-wm) which is the maximal
event in wm of which e is a proper stage;
c. for any m such that n > m ≥ 1, wm+1 is a reasonable option for e in w
(i.e., there is a reasonable chance on the basis of what is internal to e in w
that e continues in w as far as it does in wm+1), and: (i) if em is Max-wm,
then wm+1 is a world maximally similar to wm where whatever interrupts
Max-wm in wm doesn’t interrupt it in wm+1, and (ii) if em is not Max-wm,
wm+1 = wm; and
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d. either there is no Max-wn, or: (i) en =Max-wn and (ii) there is no closest
world to wn that has an event of which en is a proper stage that is a
reasonable option for e in w.
(Sharvit 2003: 412–413)
With this definition in place, Sharvit proposes that the progressive is sensitive to
realistic continuation branches:
(9) For any event e, property of events P, and world w, e ∈ PROG(w)(P) iff:
a. e is an event in w; and
b. for any realistic continuation branch C for e relative to w, there is an event
e′ and a world w′ such that 〈e′,w′〉 is in C and e′ ∈ P(w′).
(Sharvit 2003: 414)
We can illustrate how the semantics in (9) works by considering two hypothetical
scenarios discussed by Landman (1992):
(10) Mary was crossing the street (when a bus hit her).
(11) Mary was wiping out the Roman army (when a soldier incapacitated her).
To evaluate the truth of (10), we construct a continuation branch based on the
evaluation world and the ongoing event in question. We stay in the evaluation world
until Mary gets hit by bus, at which point we shift to a maximally similar world
in which a bus does not hit her and which is a reasonable option, and continue to
trace the progression of the event. Under normal circumstances, the continuation
branch will contain an event in which Mary successfully crosses the street, and
so the sentence is judged true. In a scenario like (11), on the other hand, the
prospect of Mary’s success is so unlikely that we will never be able to construct a
continuation branch based only on reasonable options which contains an event of
Mary successfully wiping out the Roman army. Hence under normal circumstances,
(11) is judged false.
2.3 Sharvit’s semantics for try
Sharvit’s core proposal is that like the progressive, try has a continuation branch-
based semantics, but differs from the progressive in two important ways. First,
whereas the progressive is sensitive to realistic continuation branches, try is sensitive
to continuation branches that are possibly non-realistic but sufficiently similar to any
realistic continuation branch. This difference is designed to account for contrasts
like the following.
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(12) a. # Mary was wiping out the Roman army.
b. Mary tried to wipe out the Roman army.
(13) a. # Mary was swimming across the Atlantic Ocean.
b. Mary tried to swim across the Atlantic Ocean.
Given the high unlikelihood of success in Mary wiping out the Roman army
or swimming across the Atlantic, the progressive is usually judged false in such
situations, but it is not hard to imagine situations in which the corresponding try-
sentences are judged acceptable. For Sharvit, this is because although both the
progressive and try assert the existence of some event related via a continuation
branch to the given event description, try admits a lower threshold of likelihood for
success.
The second important way in which try differs from the progressive is that try
has an attitudinal component. In the spirit of Heim’s (1992) semantics for want
(where want quantifies over the subject’s ‘desire’ worlds), Sharvit proposes that
try quantifies over the subject’s ‘success’ worlds. Sharvit defines ‘successful’ as
‘preferable to [the entity named by the subject] relative to the evolvement of the event
in question’ (p. 420). This readily accounts for the intuition that try-sentences tell us
something about the goals of the subject, and also correctly rules out try-sentences
in cases where the subject cannot be an attitude-bearer, as in e.g. pleonastic it as
used with weather predicates:
(14) # It tried to rain last night.
Sharvit’s semantics for try, implementing the two key features just discussed, is
as follows. (The bolding and underlining are mine and are meant to highlight the
key ways in which try differs from the progressive.)
(15) For any event e, property of events P, individual a, and world w, e∈TRY(w)(P)(a)
iff:
a. e is an event in w;
b. there is a (possibly non-realistic) continuation branch C of e relative
to w (sufficiently similar to any realistic continuation branch of e rel-
ative to w) such that there is an event-world pair 〈e*, w*〉 in C such that
e* ∈ P(w*); and
c. for every w′ compatible with what a believes in w: any world w′′ maximally
similar to w′ such that there is a (possibly non-realistic) continuation branch
C′ of e relative to w′′ (sufficiently similar to any realistic continuation
branch of e relative to w′′) and an event-world pair 〈e*, w*〉 in C′ such
that e* ∈ P(w*), is more successful to a in w relative to e than any w′′
maximally similar to w′ where there is no such continuation branch C′.
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(Sharvit 2003: 420–421)
Having proposed this semantics, Sharvit’s explanation for the ‘obligatory ex-
istential reading’ associated with try is as follows. Certain events require that the
participant named by the direct object be present from the beginning while others
do not. The former (given certain assumptions made explicit by Sharvit about the
homogeneity of events in the ‘stage-of’ relation) are correctly expected to give rise
to the obligatory existential reading.
(16) a. John tried to cut a tomato, #but there were no tomatoes.
b. John tried to push a cart, #but there was no cart.
(17) a. John tried to paint a picture, but (in the end) there was no picture.
b. John tried to find a book, but there was no book.
An event of cutting a tomato or pushing a cart, for example, requires that the
tomato and the cart be in existence from the very beginning in order for the event to
get underway. An event of painting a picture or finding a book, on the other hand, is
different: the picture and the book respectively are the end result.
3 Challenges for the continuation branch approach to try
3.1 Unlikely outcomes
Recall that for Sharvit, a key difference between try and the progressive is that
whereas the progressive is sensitive to realistic continuation branches, try is sensitive
to possibly non-realistic continuation branches that are sufficiently similar to any
realistic continuation branch. Thus although it has a higher tolerance for unrealistic
outcomes than the progressive, try is still sensitive to outcome likelihood. Here
I would like to question the idea that outcome likelihood plays any role at all in
assessing the truth of try-sentences. Consider the minimal pairs in (18)–(20), which
test the relative felicity of try and the progressive in situations of increasingly unlikely
success. In each case, the try-sentence is felicitous despite the extreme unlikelihood
of the outcome.
(18) a. # John was unknowingly paralyzed and was raising his arm.
b. John was unknowingly paralyzed and tried to raise his arm.
(19) a. # John was cutting a tomato with his mind.
b. John tried to cut a tomato with his mind.
(20) a. # John was making two plus two equal five.
b. John tried to make two plus two equal five.
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As context for (18), imagine a situation in which John is unknowingly paralyzed
and is asked to raise his arm. Short of a miracle, (18a) is false, whereas assuming
John is being cooperative, (18b) is plausibly true, despite the fact that its outcome is
next to impossible. For (19), imagine that John believes he has telekinetic powers and
intends to use them to cut a tomato. (19a) is infelicitous unless the speaker believes
she is witnessing John’s telekinesis, but (19b) can be uttered without such a belief.
Finally, (20) illustrates the same point in cases of outright logical impossibility: it is
impossible to be making two plus two equal five, but it is not impossible to try to
make two plus two equal five.2
I conclude from the foregoing considerations that outcome likelihood does not
play a role in assessing the truth of try-sentences.
3.2 Entailment patterns with (incremental) themes
Here I present a second challenge for Sharvit’s continuation branch approach to
try. There is a systematic asymmetry between try and the progressive with respect
to entailment patterns for incremental themes (and in some cases non-incremental
themes). (21) and (22) illustrate the asymmetry for incremental themes. When a
progressive sentence contains an incremental theme, there is an entailment that the
incremental theme began to change in the appropriate way: if the progressive holds
of an eating-an-apple event, part of the apple is necessarily eaten; likewise, if the
progressive holds of a raising-one’s-arm event, the arm necessarily moves upward.
The corresponding try-sentences, however, have no such entailment, as illustrated
in the (b) examples. (23) illustrates that this same asymmetry holds also for some
non-incremental themes: although ‘push a cart foward’ is an atelic event description,
(23a) nonetheless entails the cart moved forward, whereas again the corresponding
try-sentence does not.
(21) a. John was eating an apple. → Part of the apple was consumed.
b. John tried to eat an apple. 9 Part of the apple was consumed.
(22) a. John was raising his arm. → John’s arm moved upward.
b. John tried to raise his arm. 9 John’s arm moved upward.
(23) a. John was pushing a cart forward. → The cart moved forward.
b. John tried to push a cart forward. 9 The cart moved forward.
2 Sharvit (2003) does consider the problem of logically impossible outcomes, and suggests that
a solution can be had by employing Cresswell and von Stechow’s (1982) notion of structured
propositions. My point here is to show that logical impossibility is just one subtype of a systematic
insensitivity to outcome likelihood that try exhibits.
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Notice that this asymmetry has to do with the extensional component of the
meaning of try and the progressive, i.e., with what is entailed to hold in the evaluation
world. For Sharvit, the extensional components of try and the progressive are
identical: some event e holds in w. The relevant difference between try and the
progressive lies only in that try tolerates a lower outcome likelihood and has an
attitudinal component. Consequently, the above asymmetries are not captured. If the
relevant entailments hold for the progressive, then they should hold for try as well;
conversely, if the relevant entailments do not hold for try, then they should not hold
for the progressive either.
The asymmetries in (21)–(23) suggest that the difference between try and the
progressive has to do not with the relative likelihood of the outcome, but rather with
how close the outcome is to being realized. For the progressive, the event must
be developed sufficiently so that the theme argument has started to be affected in
the right way, whereas for try, this is not the case. In what follows, I develop a
formalization of this idea.
4 Mental action and event structure
As is apparent from examples like (24) (repeated from above), try-sentences do not
entail any externally observable action, nor any particular likelihood of success in
executing an externally observable action.
(24) John was unknowingly paralyzed and tried to raise his arm.
Examples like (24) are in fact familiar in the philosophical literature on action
theory, where it has been proposed that trying denotes MENTAL ACTION (see es-
pecially O’Shaughnessy 1973, Hornsby 1980, Pietroski 2008; cf. also ‘intention in
action’ as defined by Searle (1983) and ‘volition’ as defined by Lorini & Herzig
(2008)). The basic idea is that voluntary bodily movements are preceded and caused
by an internal spark on the part of the agent. Typically, such mental action leads to
an observable result, but as we see from the paralysis example, this is not always the
case.
What I want to do here is preserve Sharvit’s proposal that try has an aspectual
meaning and synthesize this with the idea that trying denotes mental action, in a way
that accounts for the data in the previous section. In this section I will sketch the
basics of the proposal before presenting a formalization in the next two sections.
I begin with the assumption that linguistically, eventualities are decomposable
into ‘stages’, and the function of aspectual morphology is to focus portions of an
eventuality (Moens & Steedman 1988, Parsons 1990, Smith 1991, Kamp & Reyle
1993, Caudal 2005). With that in mind, the core proposal consists of two ideas.
First, events that are brought about volitionally may include a ‘preparatory stage’
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whose onset corresponds to a mental action and whose transition into the ‘inner
stage’ of an event occurs precisely when the (incremental) theme begins to change
in the appropriate way.
(25) ——————–I—————————-I——————————-
PREPARATORY INNER STAGE ENDPOINT RESULT STATE
Imagine for example an eventuality of John (voluntarily) opening a door. The
preparatory stage begins when John executes a mental action to move in such a
way as to achieve this end. His arm moves and then his hand grasps the knob and
turns it. Any of these actions can be described as John trying to open a door. Once
the door begins to move in the appropriate way, the inner stage of the eventuality
has been reached, and the situation can now be described as John opening a door.
Accordingly, the second key idea is that whereas progressive aspect entails that
an event progresses to somewhere in the ‘inner stage’, try entails that an event
progresses to somewhere in either the ‘preparatory stage’ or the ‘inner stage’:3
(26) ——————–I—————————-I——————————-
PREPARATORY INNER STAGE ENDPOINT RESULT STATE
[ - - - - - PROG - - - - - -]
[- - - - - - - - - - - - try - - - - - - - - - - - - -]
This new conception of try and its relationship to the progressive lends itself
toward an account of the data in the previous section. First consider the problem of
unlikely outcomes. Under the new proposal, try-sentences are insensitive to outcome
likelihood and instead care about whether an eventuality exists in its preparatory
stage. Since the onset of the preparatory stage corresponds to a mental action, it is
possible for someone to try to raise his arm even if he is paralyzed. Second, recall
the entailment patterns with (incremental) themes. Since such themes do not begin
to change until the inner stage has been reached, and progressive aspect focuses on
the inner stage, we correctly predict that progressive sentences but not try-sentences
should entail that the theme has begun to change in the appropriate way.
5 Condoravdi’s (2009) semantics for the progressive
In order to formalize the proposals from the previous section, we need a theory of
aspectual meaning that allows us to make distinctions in the degree to which an
event has been realized. Condoravdi’s (2009) semantics for the progressive provides
3 Oftentimes, pragmatic reasoning will narrow the scope of try to the preparatory stage alone. However,
this is cancellable: John tried to open the door, and in fact succeeded.
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just this. In this section I review Condoravdi’s proposal and then in the next section
I will apply it to try.
Two background concepts are important for Condoravdi’s semantics for the
progressive. The first is the idea that degree semantics as employed in analyses of
gradable adjectives can be applied to verb meaning as well. This idea has been used
to explain variable telicity for degree achievements and incremental theme verbs
(see especially Kennedy & Levin 2008, Piñón 2008), and Condoravdi adopts the
idea that an event type is realized to degree d, where 0≤ d ≤ 1.
The second important concept is that of an ordering source (Kratzer 1981). An
ordering source o is a function from worlds w to sets of propositions that are true
relative to some ideal in w. Ordering sources can be used to order worlds according
to the definition in (27). World u is ranked higher than world v relative to an ordering
source o in w if and only if the set of propositions in o(w) that are true in v is a
subset of the set of propositions in o(w) that are true in u.
(27) u≤o(w) v⇐⇒{p|p ∈ o(w)∧ v ∈ p} ⊆ {p|p ∈ o(w)∧u ∈ p}
Condoravdi’s semantics for the progressive is given in (28).
(28) PROG(e, P) is true in w relative to c with contextual standard dc iff:
a. Degree of realization: for some d, P(w, e, d) and d ≥ dc,
b. Ordering source: there are e′, d′, and w′ such that e ⊂n f e′, d ≤ d′, w′
≤oi w, and P(w′, e′, d′)
(Condoravdi 2009: 14)
Let’s unpack these two conditions. The first condition is that there must be a
degree that exceeds a contextually determined threshold and that satisfies P(w,e,d),
where P is the given event description, e is the event in question, and w is the
evaluation world. For Condoravdi, the motivation for such a condition has to do with
sentence pairs like the following. Just as there is contextual variability in how far the
event must have progressed to judge (29a) true, so there is contextual variability in
what counts as “part of” in (29b). This parallelism is captured on the view that just
as “part of” picks out a contextually determined degree as its threshold, so does the
progressive.
(29) a. Mary was swimming across the Atlantic.
b. Mary swam across part of the Atlantic.
(30) a. Mary was wiping out the Roman Army.
b. Mary wiped part of the Roman Army.
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(Condoravdi 2009: 15)
The second condition is that there must be a triplet e′, d′, and w′ that also satisfies
the event description P and that is related to e, d and w in a particular way: e is
a nonfinal substage of e′, d is less than or equal to d′, and w′ ranks higher than w
relative to some ordering source o. The ordering source component is crucial, and it
is important that the specific choice of ordering source be contextually determined.
This is designed to account for a puzzle observed by Bonomi (1997) and exemplified
in (31).
(31) CONTEXT: I boarded a plane headed to NYC but which was hijacked and
ended up in DC.
a. I was flying to NYC. (in view of the schedule of the flight)
b. I was flying to DC. (in view of the actual course of events)
(adapted from Condoravdi 2009: 15)
The observation is that the progressive can be used to truthfully assert two
seemingly contradictory propositions regarding the same situation. In a context
where I boarded a plane headed to NYC but which is hijacked and ended up in DC,
it is truthful to assert that I was flying to NYC, but it is also truthful to assert that I
was flying to DC. For Condoravdi, the ordering source is where this contradiction
is resolved: when I assert that I was flying to NYC, the evaluation is relative to an
ordering source based on something like the schedule of the flight, the intentions
of the pilot, my intentions, etc. When I assert that I was flying to DC, on the other
hand, the evaluation is relative to an ordering source based on what actually ended
up happening. In this way, Bonomi’s puzzle is solved.
6 A new semantics for try
My proposed semantics for try is given in (32).
(32) TRY(e, P, a) is true in w iff:
a. Degree of realization: for some d, P(w, e, d) and d > 0;
b. Ordering source: there are e′, d′, and w′ such that e ⊂n f e′, d ≤ d′, w′
≤oa w, and P(w′, e′, d′)
(where oa is an ordering source based on a’s intentions)
On this approach, the semantics of try differs from Condoravdi’s semantics for
the progressive in two important respects. The first has to do with the ‘degree of
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realization’ condition: whereas the progressive requires that the event in question be
realized to a degree that meets or exceeds a contextually determined threshold, try
requires merely that the event be realized to any arbitrary degree above zero.4 This
has the desirable consequence that the event may exist in a preparatory stage (see
data in section 3.1) and any (incremental) theme need not yet be affected (see data
in section 3.2).
The second difference between try and the progressive is that whereas the
progressive is evaluated relative to a contextually determined ordering source, try
requires an ordering source based on the intentions of the entity named by the
subject. This correctly captures the fact that in the aforementioned hijacking context,
using try does not give us the same flexibility as the progressive:
(33) CONTEXT: I boarded a plane headed to NYC but which was hijacked and
ended up in DC.
(34) a. I tried to fly to NYC.
b. # I tried to fly to DC.
In summary, the proposal is that try-sentences must satisfy two conditions: the
‘actional’ component, requiring that the event in question be realized to some degree
above zero, and the ‘attitudinal’ component, requiring that the entity named by the
subject bear an intention relative to the given event description. Accordingly, the
prediction is that there are two ways in which try-sentences may be judged false.
First, there may be attitude without action, i.e., a situation in which the entity named
by the subject bears the appropriate intentional attitude toward the event description
but there is no related action. Here, try forms a useful minimal pair with intend,
which names the relevant attitude stripped away from any action. Thus it is possible
to intend to do something without trying to do it (the attitude is present but not
the action), but it is not possible to try to do something without intending to do it
(because trying entails an intentional attitude).5 This is illustrated in the following
minimal pair.
(35) a. John intended to eat an apple, but he never tried to do so.
b. # John tried to eat an apple, but he never intended to do so.
The second way in which try-sentences may be judged false is when there is
an action but no attitude. This may happen in one of two ways. First, in (36a),
4 Given the move to considering the preparatory stage to be the beginning of the event scale, we also
need to add an additional condition to Condoravdi’s semantics for the progressive, namely that the
contextually determined degree threshold be located somewhere in the inner stage (dc ∈ INNER
STAGE). This ensures that the progressive always entails that the inner stage has been reached.
5 This point is further corroborated by the observation that try to X is roughly paraphrasable as act on
one’s intention to X. I thank David Beaver for drawing my attention to this fact.
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the subject is expletive and hence may not bear an attitude, and so the sentence is
correctly predicted to be infelicitous. Second, in (36b), the subject is a potential
attitude bearer, but we see that it is not contradictory to assert that an agent did
something without trying to do so: the action is present but not the attitude.
(36) a. # It tried to rain.
b. John did not try to cross the street; he crossed the street accidentally.
In closing this section, let us briefly reconsider the ‘obligatory existential read-
ing’, the empirical motivation that Sharvit presents for her analysis of try:
(37) John tried to cut a tomato, ##but there were no tomatoes to cut.
For Sharvit, the contradictory status of such examples follows from the twofold
proposal that (1) try entails the existence of some event related via an appropriate
continuation branch to an event of cutting a tomato, and (2) a cutting-a-tomato event
requires the presence of a tomato from the beginning.
On my proposed semantics for try, however, we do not expect such examples
to be contradictory, since it is conceivable that the preparatory stage of a cutting-a-
tomato event need not include an actual tomato. I would therefore like to suggest that
Sharvit’s ‘obligatory existential reading’ is an implicature rather than an entailment,
having to do with the way we reason about rational agents. In the above case, for
example, the pragmatic reasoning may go as follows: since John is engaged in an
action with the intention of cutting a tomato, then assuming John is of sound mind,
there must be a tomato to cut.
As expected, there is evidence that this implicature, although strong, is cance-
lable. The felicity of (38a) is usefully contrasted with (38b), which brings out a
clear difference between try and the progressive not captured by Sharvit’s approach.
Whereas the progressive really does bring about Sharvit’s ‘obligatory existential
reading’ effect, it appears that the effect may be cancelled with try under appropriate
conditions.
(38) a. John tried to cut a tomato, but he was hallucinating and there was no
tomato to cut.
b. John was cutting a tomato, #but he was hallucinating and there was no
tomato to cut.
7 Syntactic matters
In this section, I offer some preliminary remarks on how the proposed semantic
analysis of try may relate to its syntax. In particular, the syntactic observation is that
try is obligatorily a control verb, disallowing overt embedded subjects via ECM or
finite complementation:
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(39) *John tried (for) Bill to open the door.
(40) *John tried that Bill open the door.
As the proposed semantics stands, structures like these are not obviously ruled
out.6 However, the proposed semantics for try does make these facts look non-
accidental: it is a general property of aspectual morphemes that they do not introduce
arguments. This holds both for grammaticalized aspectual morphemes like the
progressive and for aspectual verbs like start and continue.
(41) *John was Bill opening the door.
(42) *John started (for) Bill to open the door.
(43) *John continued (for) Bill to open the door.
Of course, try differs from these other aspectual morphemes in that it does
impose a semantic restriction on its subject, but the similarity is that in all of these
cases, there can be no more arguments than are licensed by the event description that
the aspectual morpheme operates on. This can be captured if we assume that try is a
raising predicate: it combines with a vP (i.e., a verb in combination with all of its
arguments), and the subject of the vP raises to occupy the subject position associated
with try. In order to capture the fact that try nonetheless entails something about its
subject, we might hypothesize that from the raised position, the subject can bind a
variable that is part of the meaning of try and that corresponds to the attitude-holder
associated with the intentional ordering source.7 On this view, try does not introduce
an argument; rather, it imposes a restriction on an argument that is already present.
The proposed syntactic parallelism between try and aspectual morphemes like the
progressive is illustrated in the following trees.
6 Given the semantics in the previous section, the predicted meaning for (39) is something like ‘An event
of Bill opening the door was underway (i.e., realized to a degree above zero), and the progression
of this event is in line with John’s intentions.’ A case could be made, however, that the variant in
(40), in which try embeds a finite clause, is ruled out on the grounds that try semantically requires
an event description as its complement. If finite complements denote propositions rather than event
descriptions, then a type mismatch results here.
7 See Hacquard 2006: 130 for a similar suggestion for root modals. Hacquard suggests that a raising-
only analysis of root modals can be maintained if, when the subject raises, it may bind a variable in
the modal’s accessibility relation.
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(44) AspP
John Asp′
try vP
John open the door
(45) AspP
John Asp′
PROG vP
John open the door
Cinque (2006) in fact proposes based on crosslinguistic evidence from restruc-
turing and verbal morphosyntax that try realizes an inflectional-layer functional head
(‘conative aspect’) and hence instantiates a monoclausal raising structure rather than
a biclausal PRO-control structure as on the traditional view. If Cinque is correct, then
the ban on embedded subjects under try follows not directly from the semantics but
rather from a general syntactic ban on the introduction of arguments by inflectional
heads. The semantics may still be indirectly responsible, however, since it is likely
that the semantic status of try as an aspectual morpheme is ultimately responsible
for its realization as an inflectional morpheme in the first place.
8 Conclusions and outlook
This paper had two main goals. One goal was to provide an updated analysis of
the semantics of try using Sharvit 2003 as a starting point. I maintained Sharvit’s
core proposal that try is closely related to progressive aspect, but presented two
empirical shortcomings of her account that suggested an approach unlike Sharvit’s
‘continuation branch’ analysis. As an alternative, I proposed, following much work
in action theory, that ‘trying’ denotes mental action, and I presented a formalization
based on Condoravdi 2009. According to the new account, try requires the existence
of some event that has been realized to any degree above zero and has a modal
component with an ordering source based on the intentions of the entity named by
the subject. The empirical advantages that this account has over Sharvit’s (2003)
semantics for try are that it allows for try to be compatible with event descriptions
that have a highly unlikely probability for full realization and it also accounts for
entailment patterns with incremental (and some non-incremental) themes. One of the
implications that this analysis has which extends beyond the semantics of try is that
the linguistic notion of event structure must be enriched to include a ‘mental action’
stage. Further research will be needed to know whether there is support for this idea
in other aspectual morphemes or in other event semantics-related phenomena.
The second goal of the paper was to investigate the relationship between the
semantics of try and its syntactic status as a verb that requires control and disallows
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overt embedded subjects. Although the semantics proposed in the paper does not
derive the syntactic behavior of try, I suggested that there is nonetheless an important
connection: aspectual morphemes as a class disallow overt embedded subjects, and
so if try has an aspectual meaning as proposed by Sharvit and maintained in this
paper, then its syntactic status plausibly follows from this more general fact about
aspectual morphemes. This view converges with Cinque’s (2006) evidence from
crosslinguistic morphosyntax and restructuring that try is a functional morpheme
that realizes conative aspect in the inflectional layer of the clause. In this connection,
this work is part of a larger project (Grano In prep.) aimed at understanding the
relationship between the semantics of control verbs and their (in)ability to occur with
overt embedded subjects; other verbs under investigation include want, aspectual
verbs, implicative verbs, and root modals.
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